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Despite the recent increase in capital flows to Sub-
Saharan Africa, the region remains largely marginalized 
in financial globalization and chronically dependent 
on official development aid. And with the potential 
decline in the level of official development assistance in 
a context of global financial crisis, the need to increase 
domestic resources mobilization as well as non-debt 
generating external resources is critical now more 
than ever before. However, the debate on resource 
mobilization has overlooked an important untapped 
source of funds consisting of the massive stocks of 
private wealth stashed in Western financial centers, a 
substantial part of which left the region in the form of 
capital flight. This paper argues that the repatriation of 
flight capital should take a more prominent place in this 
debate from a moral standpoint and for clear economic 
reasons. On the moral side, the argument is that a large 
proportion of the capital flight legitimately belongs to 
the Africans and therefore must be restituted to the 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to enhance domestic resource mobilization in support of investment and economic 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at hfofack@worldbank.org.  
legitimate claimants. The economic argument is that 
repatriation of flight capital will propel the sub-continent 
on a higher sustainable growth path while preserving its 
financial stability and without mortgaging the welfare 
of its future generations through external borrowing. 
The analysis in the paper demonstrates quantitatively 
that the gains from repatriation are large and dominate 
the expected benefits from other sources such as debt 
relief. It is estimated that if only a quarter of the stock of 
capital flight was repatriated to Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
region would go from trailing to leading other developing 
regions in terms of domestic investment, thus initiating 
a ‘big-push’-led sustainable long-term economic growth. 
The paper proposes some strategies for inducing capital 
flight repatriation, but cautions that the success of this 
program is contingent on strong political will on the 
part of African and Western governments and effective 
coordination and cooperation at the global level.   
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I.  Introduction 
In the Handbook of Development Economics, Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989) summarized the challenges of 
resource mobilization in support of economic growth and development in low-income countries facing 
debt overhang and plummeting credit ratings as follows: “Commercial banks are unlikely to provide 
much development finance in years to come. Bond markets, likewise, will be closed for countries with 
poor debt experience. Efforts to develop private capital flows to debtor countries must therefore, focus 
on other mechanisms.” Decades later, Cardoso & Dornbusch’s assessment and recommendation still 
hold and could greatly inform the growth process in the post-HIPC Completion Point era in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
In addition to their poor credit ratings, the majority of Highly Indebted Poor Countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa face major challenges that are further compounded by the steadily declining level of international 
development assistance [World Bank (2006)].2 To enhance the impact of debt relief granted under the 
HIPC initiative,3 there is one possible route that is still unexplored, and yet could generate the massive 
inflows of capital in support of a ‘big push’ to accelerate growth: the repatriation of flight capital. Indeed, 
the hundreds of billions of dollars of capital flight from SSA represent a sizable amount of untapped 
resources with tremendous potential for economic growth and development if repatriated to source 
countries. 
 
According to most recent estimates, the cumulative stock of capital flight— the voluntary exits of private 
residents’ capital either for a safe haven or for investments made in foreign currency—from Sub-Saharan 
Africa amounts to USD 606.7 billion over the three decades spanning 1970-2004 [Ndikumana and Boyce 
(2008)].4 The high level of capital flight poses serious challenges for domestic resources mobilization in 
support of investment and growth in the Africa. These challenges are even more important because the 
region is confronted with acute shortage of capital and is increasingly marginalized in the global 
distribution of private capital flows, which remains heavily skewed and tilted towards OECD and 
emerging market economies [World Bank (2006)].5  These challenges are also exacerbated by the absence 
or relatively low level of ‘additionality’ of resources within the HIPC framework.   
 
The absence of a ‘big push’ in the form of large capital inflows supporting the expansion of productive 
investment, and as a complement to the HIPC initiative is a common problem in stabilization programs 
implemented in most developing countries. In the aftermath of these programs, most countries often 
lack the resources needed to operate at the level of investment required to attain robust and sustained 
growth rates; and when capital does come, it is usually in the form of balance of payments support 
directed toward highly liquid domestic assets and final consumptions, rather than in physical capital 
                                                      
2 In fact, since 2005, official development assistance has been declining steadily, and even took a negative value in net 
terms, reflecting net capital outflows from developing countries [World Bank (2006)].  
3 Debt reduction granted to the first batch of 18 countries which became eligible to the HIPC Completion Point under 
the MDRI for concessional lending granted either through the IDA window or the African Development Bank facility is 
extended over a four decades, spanning the period 2006-2045. For further details see World Bank (2006). 
4 Capital flight is sometimes measured as errors and omissions in the balance of payments and often refers to illicitly 
acquired resources. However, the estimated cumulative stock cited here is based on an elaborate methodology that is 
described in detail in Ndikumana and Boyce (2008).  
5 The Global Development Finance Report published in 2006, highlighted the increasingly skewed distribution of capital 
movements at the global level, with the Sub-Saharan African region largely marginalized from the path of global capital 
flows and receiving the lowest share of FDI.   3
accumulation [Laban (1991)].6 Yet sustained increases in capital stock are key to welfare improvement 
and to the success of stabilization programs, in that it increases the tax base and prospects for 
employment creation, thus mitigating the risks of recurrence of fiscal deficits and macroeconomic 
imbalances.        
 
In the past a number of scholars have advocated that stabilization programs be accompanied by policy 
measures to enhance massive reflows of resources in the form of capital repatriation to source countries. 
While such repatriation schemes may primarily be viewed as an integral part of a ‘big push’ model, they 
may also greatly enhance the success of stabilization programs [Dornbusch (1991)]. According to 
Dornbusch, capital repatriation reduces the likelihood that the government will run against its external 
constraints and hence be forced to abandon its stabilization plan. In addition, higher levels of investment 
in the initially noisy period of adjustment could also mitigate the risk of a decline in living standards and 
therefore broaden the political support base to advance program implementation [Blejer and Ize (1989)]. 
 
Capital repatriation schemes have been used successfully to boost domestic investment and growth in a 
number of countries in Asia and Latin America. One of the most publicized cases is the mobilization of 
domestic resources through capital repatriation using debt-equity-swaps programs in Chile [Armendariz 
de Aghion (1991), Laban and Larrain (1998)]. As a result of this program, Chile achieved investment and 
growth rates in scales unprecedented. Interestingly, advanced economies have also drawn on capital 
repatriation schemes to spur growth. The launching of a tax amnesty scheme in favor of private foreign 
asset holders, enabled the government of Italy to recoup 30 billions of US dollars from Swiss banks in 
2001 [Watts (2002)].7          
 
In spite of the significant potential of capital flight repatriation for growth and macroeconomic 
stabilization, the Sub-Saharan African region has not benefited from it. Yet it is the most capital starved 
region of the world with the highest proportion of its assets held abroad [Collier et al (2001)].8 A 
substantial share of these assets is held abroad in the form of liquid assets especially as book deposits. 
The highly liquid nature of these assets makes the expected transaction costs associated with their 
repatriation relatively low, and effective repatriation highly probable, provided that there is a sufficiently 
political will and commitment at the global level.  
 
The object of this paper is to investigate the channels through which KF repatriation will benefit African 
countries in terms of higher economic growth. We emphasize the gains through higher domestic 
investment.  The analysis shows that if only 25% of the estimated assets held abroad were repatriated to 
source countries in support of domestic investments, the sub-continent would go from trailing to leading 
other developing regions in terms of domestic investment. Its ratio of domestic investment to GDP 
would increase from 18.5% to 29.6%. Comparatively, 25% of the stock of capital flight from the 40 
                                                      
6 Empirical evidences have supported the hypothesis of decumulation of productive assets over most of the adjustment 
era in Sub-Saharan Africa [Easterly (2002)]. 
7 Similarly, ongoing disputes between the US and Swiss officials involving US citizens who have used Swiss bank-secrecy 
laws to hide assets and engage in tax evasion may result in a repatriation of a large amount of resources. Already the 
Swiss Bank UBS has agreed to pay US$780 million to the US government to avoid prosecution [Barrett (2009)].  
8 However, these authors associate the flight of capital to portfolio diversification, as primary motives, a variant from the 
standards determinants of capital flight from Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, to the extent that most resources leaving 
the continent through capital flight channel are in the form of liquid assets rather than securities and equities, the 
diversification away from risk and security argument may be more robust in explaining the recurrent outflows.    
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countries in the sample represents more than twice the total volume of debt relief received by this group 
of countries. Thus, the growth and welfare returns from capital flight repatriation are clearly superior to 
expected gains under the stand alone HIPC relief, suggesting that a ‘big push’ in the form of massive 
reflows of capital could highly complement the HIPC initiative and enhance its success in recipient 
countries.9   
 
II.  Recent Developments in Capital Flows from and to Developing Countries  
 
Under the impulse of information and communication technology, the process of globalization has 
contributed to a dramatic increase in the speed and movements of capital at the global level [World Bank 
(2002, 2006), Fofack (2009)]. Although this surge in capital flows is a rebound following the 1997 East 
Asian financial crisis, it has been very strong and robust. In particular, since that rebound, capital flows 
to developing countries have grown unabated at least until the onset of the current global economic 
crisis.  
 
Capital flows towards developing countries reached a new record high in 2005,  a year that a World Bank 
report refers to as the “landmark year in global development finance” [World Bank (2006)]. According to 
this report, total net flows (from official and private sources) increased to US$472 billion in 2005. 
However, this statement must have been a brisk assessment because capital flows have grown in 
crescendo, and achieved an even more impressive level in 2006, when net flows to developing countries 
reached US$571 billion setting yet another record [World Bank (2007a)]. 
 
Nevertheless, the new threshold established in 2005 would have been even higher if the distributions of 
net official and private flows had not followed divergent paths. While net private capital flows 
continuously increased after the reversal to buoyancy in the financial markets following the global 
recovery from the Asian financial crisis, net official flows remained on a path of steady decline, taking on 
negative values in subsequent years, reflecting net capital outflow from developing countries.10  
 
The impressive rate of expansion of capital flows is therefore largely the result of net private flows 
[World Bank (2007a)]. This remarkable increase in net private capital flows particularly reflects the 
growing scope of foreign direct investment and globalization of financial flows [Kasekende (2001), 
Moran et al. (2005)]. It is argued that foreign direct investment is becoming an important contributor to 
economic growth, and that the benefits of financial globalization are increasingly felt in developing 
countries [IMF (2007), World Bank (2007a)].  
 
While net equity inflows (portfolio and foreign direct investment) continue to account for the lion’s 
share of net private flows (over 60%), market-based flows from private creditors in the form of bonds or 
short-term debt are also growing quite rapidly, reflecting the maturation of financial markets and 
improvement of credit worthiness in a number of developing economies. Recent estimates suggest that 
capital inflows from market-based debt are growing even more rapidly than equity flows. Since 1998, 
                                                      
9 Indeed, in spite of access to debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, debt sustainability indicators have been 
deteriorating rather rapidly in a number of post-Completion Point countries, a path which is raising the specter of 
another debt cycle [World Bank (2006)].   
10 The negative net official flows reflect a long-term trend of declining official development assistance. At the same time, 
a growing number of emerging market economies which are accumulating reserves are  changing the landscape of 
international financial architecture [Summers (2006), Fofack (2009)]. In fact over the past few years, the aggregated value 
of official flows to East Asia and Latin America has been globally negative. For further details, see World Bank (2006).    5
gross market-based capital flows to developing countries have grown by more than twofold to reach 
US$385 billion in 2005 [World Bank (2006)]. These developments reflect the growing interest of 
international investors in local-currency bond markets, and reduction of political risks and 
macroeconomic instability in an increasingly large number of developing countries, particularly in 
Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and Latin America, the regions which are benefiting the most from 
the global surge in capital flows and where yields and potential gains from currency appreciation have 
been the highest.  
 
In the midst of this surge in net private capital flows, the heavily skewed global distribution of net private 
capital flows to developing countries has persisted. The Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region, East 
Asia and Pacific (EAP) region and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region continue to enjoy the 
lion’s share of global capital flows to developing countries (Table A1 and Figure 1). While Sub-Saharan 
Africa leads all developing regions in official flows such as ODA, it continues to trail in terms of private 
flows. Naturally, this increasingly skewed distribution of global capital flows further marginalizes Sub-
Saharan Africa, a phenomenon compounded by the delayed financial deepening in the sub-region.  
 
SSA’s share of global net private capital flows to developing countries declined in the midst of financial 
globalization and now accounts for just 10%, against 41% for the EAP region, and about 35% for the 
LAC (Table A1 and Figure 1). Moreover, market-based inflows to SSA were even lower (less than 3% of 
total) and the majority of it went to South Africa, which accounts for over 50 percent of gross market-
based capital flows to the region [World Bank (2006)]. 
 
Figure 1: Share of net private capital flows by region (% of total flows to developing 
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Source: Global Development Finance 2008 
* Note: 2005 for net private flows. 
 
The continued strong growth of market-based financial flows reflects the changing pattern of global 
finance. Equity flows, market-based capital flows and official flows constitute the main forms of capital   6
flows to developing countries.11 However, while the bulk of the flows to the three largest recipient 
regions (EAP, ECA and LAC) are primarily driven by investment motives and opportunities, capital 
flows to SSA are still dominated by official development assistance. FDI to SSA heavily concentrates in 
natural resources and particularly oil and gas sectors, and has been highly volatile [UNECA (2006)]. 
 
However, unlike private flows and particularly FDI, part of the official flows come in the form of 
balance of payments support, and as such are primarily used to finance current account deficits. In this 
regard, their prospects for expanding capital expenditures for long-run growth and economic 
development are likely to be lower. In a number of empirical studies based on a cross-section of 
countries, Kose et al. (2006) found that non-FDI flows are less conducive to economic growth than 
FDI. Similarly, a recent IMF survey found that countries with higher shares of FDI in total liabilities 
experience higher rates of economic growth [IMF (2007)].  
 
In this regard, the continued large inflows of private capital to emerging market economies may largely 
explain the robust economic growth enjoyed by these countries. These growth effects of private capital 
inflows further highlight the benefits of this mode of external financing for engendering virtuous circles 
of long-run economic growth. According to an IMF study, an increase in FDI by 10 percentage points of 
GDP is associated with an increase in average growth of 0.3 percentage points (IMF 2007). The massive 
infusion of capital in emerging market economies played a key role in creating and sustaining the ‘big 
push’ model— to foster growth and employment creation leading to long-run per capita income growth 
and economic development during adjustment eras [Edwards (1990), Akyuz and Gore (2001)].12  
 
However, while the initial ‘big push’ primarily relies on FDI inflows, the repatriation of flight capital held 
abroad by countries’ residents later played a key role in sustaining the process of capital infusion to 
sustain economic growth. This process of capital repatriation has been largely documented in the LAC 
region where capital flight was significant in scope and magnitude, with estimates of cumulative stock 
(including interest earnings) in the range of  US$350 billion by the late 1980s [Lessard and Williamson 
(1987), Pastor (1989)]. However, in addition to incentives created by the improved macroeconomic 
environment, the repatriation process was facilitated by the fact that more than 50 percent of flight 
capital was held abroad in the form of liquid assets [Armendariz de Aghion (1991)]. 
 
According to the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
significant reflows of capital to the region took place in the 1990s when net private capital flows 
increased by more than sevenfold. Though numerous countries in the region enjoyed the process of 
capital repatriation, Chile is often cited as the most successful case where massive repatriation of capital 
was used to finance productive investment. Net capital inflows to Chile increased to US$3 billion in the 
early 1990s, from about US$1 billion in the 1980s. These repatriation schemes contributed to a rapid 
                                                      
11 Workers remittances are also growing quite rapidly as another form of private resource inflows to developing 
countries. Most recent estimates suggest that this form of resources flows has increased significantly and now averages 
over 5 percent of GDP across the developing world. However, Sub-Saharan Africa still has the smallest share compared 
to other regions. Remittances going to Sub-Saharan Africa increased to nearly USD 20 billion in 2008, up from USD 10 
billion in 2005. Despite their steadily growing trend, remittances cannot sustain the ‘big push’ given the widening 
financing gaps faced by the continent and also because remittances are primarily directed to finance household final 
consumption [Ozden and Schiff (2006), UNECA (2006), Gupta et al. (2007)]. 
12 In fact while countries in Asia were experiencing investment booms and rapid per capita income growth, Sub-Saharan 
African countries faced a rapid decline of gross capital formation in the face of falling investment rates and excess 
depreciation of capital during the adjustment era [Akyuz and Gore (2001), Bayraktar and Fofack (2007)].     7
increase in FDI inflows to Chile, which received more than 15 percent of private investment flows to 
Latin America throughout the 1990s [Laban and Larrain (1998)].  
 
The massive inflow of capital to Chile in the 1990s is often attributed to a combination of favorable 
external and domestic factors such as increasing interest rate differentials with poorly-performing 
advanced economies and reduction of the country risk premium, especially following its exit from debt 
overhang and successful macroeconomic stabilization program. However, it is believed that the 
improvement of credit worthiness and implementation of debt-equity swaps also played a critical role in 
the Chilean ‘big push’.13 
 
According to Edwards (1990), debt-equity swaps emerged as effective instruments for reducing external 
debt and increasing private capital flows, contributing to over fivefold increase in capital repatriation.14 
According to the Institute of International Finance, more than 50 percent of foreign direct investment 
flowing into the LAC region in the late 1980s and 1990s took place under that program.          
 
In contrast, evidence of repatriation of capital flight to Sub-Saharan Africa is very limited. The purchase 
of divested state-owned enterprises in Uganda using repatriated flight capital, following the liberalization 
of capital account, may be viewed as a variant of the debt-equity-swaps, albeit on a much smaller scale.  
Recent estimates suggest that the cumulative stock of flight capital from the region reached the critical 
threshold of USD 606.7 billion in 2004, this, even as countries were striving to meet the HIPC 
conditionalities that grant eligibility to debt relief [Ndikumana and Boyce (2008)].  
 
However, in the midst of this rather disappointing record, Nigeria, one of the  countries which has 
suffered tremendously from capital flight over the years successfully recovered half a billion dollar from 
Swiss banks in 2005 [World Bank (2007b)]. Though marginal—the cumulative stock of flight capital 
from Nigeria up to 2004 amounts to USD 240.7 billion—, this repatriation of flight capital sets a 
precedent for other countries. It is occurring at a particularly critical and opportune moment, when the 
international community (confronted with the increasing costs of corruption and capital flight, most 
notably illustrated by the persistence of widespread poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and the widening 
income gap with the rest of the world) is working towards the establishment of an institutional 
framework for curbing illicit capital outflows and ensuring the repatriation of past flight capital.15  
 
The commitment of the international community to addressing this financial hemorrhage goes back to 
December 2000 when the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 55/188 in which it called upon 
                                                      
13 In particular, the implementation of macroeconomic reforms in Chile and reduction of external debt resulted in a 
significant improvement of credit rating in the early 1990s. Chile reached investment grade risk rating of BBB from S&P, 
the highest in Latin America at the time. The rating has since improved, further enhancing prospects for FDI and 
portfolio investments. By comparison, credit worthiness remains low across Sub-Saharan Africa where most countries 
are not even rated. The few exceptions are South Africa and Mauritius which enjoy rating comparable to Chile [World 
Bank (2006)]. Not surprisingly, these two countries have received the bulk of private capital inflows into the region.     
14 The debt-equity-swaps refer to a technique initially developed to reduce a country debt burden through the conversion 
of a debt from a loan into a firm of government equity holding. This technique was widely used in Latin America. 
Though Chile aggressively made use of this technique, it was also implemented in Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Argentina, resulting in massive inflows of capital.   
15 The widening income and welfare gap between SSA and the rest of the developing world is reflected in the divergent 
performance on the Millennium Development Goals. While most other regions are slated to meet these globally 
accepted benchmarks, the SSA region is identified as the one region that is farthest from target [Berg and Qureshi 
(2005), UNECA (2007a, 2007b)].    8
countries to cooperate through the United Nations system by devising ways and means of preventing the 
illegal transfer of assets and repatriating illegally transferred funds. Following that resolution, asset 
recovery was identified as a new and complex field of international cooperation during the United 
Nations Convention against corruption held in 2006. That same year, the International Centre for Asset 
Recovery (ICAR) was established by the Basel Institute on Governance. And in September 2007, the 
Stolen Asset Recovery (STAR) initiative was jointly launched by the World Bank and United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime [World Bank (2007b)].   
 
At the same time, the recovery of looted assets and repatriation of capital flight to source countries is 
marred with a number of challenges. Not the least because the costs associated with capital flight are not 
uniformly distributed at the global level. The loss of assets in the form of capital flight for source 
countries in the south is a benefit in terms savings for recipient countries in the West, which have an 
incentive to resist repatriation to source countries. Historically, countries seeking the return of flight 
capital or stolen assets have often been confronted with the challenges of obtaining domestic freezing 
and confiscation orders that are necessary for the enforcement of such judgments. Moreover, most 
jurisdictions do not allow for the confiscation and return of assets on the basis of a criminal conviction.  
 
However, according to experts from the International Centre for Asset Recovery, the overwhelming 
majority of capital flight from Sub-Saharan Africa is held abroad in the form of liquid assets, and 
particularly in the form of holdings of bank deposits and notes. In this regard, the transaction costs 
associated with the repatriation of these assets should be relatively low. Essentially, repatriation hinge on 
the political will and the extent of coordination at the international level.  
 
For instance while political commitment played a critical role in the recovery of billions of US dollars to 
sanction the misconduct of executives involved in the savings-and-loan debacle by the US government, 
cooperation at the international level enhanced the repatriation of a portion of flight capital to the 
Philippines in the post-Marcos era.  These cases of success at recovering looted assets in advanced and 
developing countries augur well and could greatly inform the newly established STAR initiative and 
enhance the repatriation of flight capital in support of the ‘big push’ model and as a complement to the 
HIPC initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa.16      
 
III.    Analytical Framework: Linkages between Capital Flight, the Government Budget, 
Investment, and Growth 
 
We start by describing a simple theoretical model that allows us to identify the channels through which 
capital flight can affect economic performance in the context of optimization of inter-temporal 
allocation of resources by private agents.  This provides us with some insights on the gains that will 
accrue from both curbing capital flight and repatriating capital flight. We will especially emphasize the 
effects through the government budget (revenue and expenditure) and domestic investment through 
impact of capital repatriation on savings. 
 
From a portfolio choice perspective, capital flight arises as private agents seek to maximize the returns to 
assets by taking advantage of higher risk-adjusted returns abroad and by evading domestic taxation.  As 
                                                      
16 These prospects are further enhanced by the international context of global financial crisis which has fostered 
increased emphasis on global financial governance, most notably illustrated by pressures on traditional safe havens 
countries to lift bank-secrecy laws, which has abated capital flight and tax evasion.     9
resources flee the country, economic performance is adversely affected through the direct effects on 
domestic capital accumulation (lower domestic savings) and through the effects on the government 
budget.  In particular, capital flight directly and indirectly causes higher external borrowing, which 
depresses domestic investment and economic growth through the debt overhang effects. Conversely a 
decline in capital flight and capital flight reversal (repatriation) will reduce the need to borrow abroad, 
raise domestic savings (higher private savings and tax revenue), thus resulting in higher domestic 
investment and growth. The simple model described below allows us to identify these various channels 
that link capital flight to economic performance, which in turn shed light on the potential gains from 
capital flight repatriation or reversal. 
 
We consider that private agents maximize lifetime utility subject to lifetime resources.  To simplify the 
exposition, we reduce the lifetime to two periods, today (at time t) and tomorrow (at time t+1).  In 
period t, the agent has an endowment W from which the agent consumes (C) and saves in the form of 
domestic capital (K) and foreign capital (or capital flight, F).  In the second (and last) period, the agent 
consumes output produced using the income from domestic and foreign capital.  Domestic capital earns 
a rate of return of r and is taxed at the rate of   while capital flight earns a rate of return of   and it is 
not taxed. 
 
The optimization problem is the following: 
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The consolidated budget constraint is the following: 



















                                 (4) 
Equation (4) implies that return differentials in favor of foreign assets as well as distortionary taxation of 
domestic assets induce capital flight.  Moreover, capital flight is likely to induce more capital flight simply 
because capital flight raises utility (by causing the budget constraint to shift out).   
 
One additional implication of equation (4) is that exchange rate movements will have larger effects on 
households that do not have a significant amount of assets abroad.  Households holding only domestic 
assets bear the full costs of the depreciation of the national currency (which, among other things, reduces 
the domestic rate of return) while households with foreign assets are able to hedge against the risk of 
currency devaluation.   
 
To motivate the effects of decline capital flight or capital flight repatriation on economic performance, 
first we consider the effects through the government budget, and then the effects on domestic capital 
accumulation and long-run growth.  The government budget constraint can be represented as follows: 
t t t t t t M B R K B r G           1 ) 1 (      (5) 
where G is government expenditures in the first period (including transfers), B is government borrowing, 
R is government revenue from sources other than taxes on domestic assets, and  M  is seignorage 
(money creation). Capital flight affects the government’s budget by reducing taxable domestic assets, 
which forces the government to either borrow (domestically and from abroad,  B  ) or resort to money 
creation ( M  ).     10
 
Similarly, capital flight reduces domestic investment directly for a given level of initial endowment as 
evidenced in equation (2), but also indirectly by increasing macroeconomic uncertainty.  The model thus 
can be used to illustrate the phenomena of debt-fueled capital flight and debt-driven capital flight emphasized 
in Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) and Boyce (1993).  
 
Conversely, the model allows us to track the gains from a decline in capital flight or repatriation of 
capital flight through government budget. A decline in capital flight or capital flight repatriation will 
increase taxable domestic assets, which will raise government revenue. Two effects follow with 
accompanying impact on domestic investment. First, higher tax revenue increases domestic saving, 
which will results in higher public investment and, consequently, higher total investment. Second, the 
lower need for borrowing will reduce macroeconomic uncertainty. The two effects will induce higher 
private investment. 
 
We describe the linkages between capital flight on long-run economic growth using a simple Solow 
growth model where capital flight is assumed to affect growth by reducing the volume of domestic 
saving that effectively finance domestic investment and by the fact that capital smuggling reduces 
effective labor productivity.  We assume that the potential saving rate is s and that a fraction   of 
national output is smuggled in the form of capital flight.  We also assume that a fraction   of effective 
labor L is spent on capital smuggling.  Total saving available for domestic investment is:  
t t Y s S ) (             ( 6 )  
Domestic output is produced using domestic capital according to the following production technology: 
       1 ) 1 ( t t t K L A Y        ( 7 )  
where A is total productivity (assumed constant).  In per-worker terms ( L K k L Y y / ; /   ), 
equation (7) becomes: 
 ) , ( ) 1 ( 1
t t t k f k A y               ( 8 )  
Assuming that the population grows at the rate of n and that capital depreciates at the rate of  , the 
change in capital stock can be described by the following equation: 
t t t k n k f s k ) ( ) , ( ) (                ( 9 )  
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Steady-state output increases as the saving rate (s ) increases and decreases as capital flight intensity 
increases (larger   and  ). 
Using the production function specified above, we obtain the growth rate of capital stock as follows: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( /              n k A s k k k       (11) 
Equation (11) shows that the growth rate of capital stock – thus the growth rate of output – declines 
when capital flight increases via an increase in the fraction of output smuggled  ) (  and an increase in 
the fraction of effective labor spent on capital smuggling ) ( . 
The steady-state level of capital stock is given by:   11
    / 1 )] /( ) 1 )( ( [ *     n s A k       ( 1 2 )  
Equation (12) implies that   and   have a negative effect on the steady-state level of capital stock 










).  That is, capital accumulation will be lower as a higher fraction of income is 
smuggled abroad and as a larger fraction of effective labor is spent on capital smuggling.  
 
The model has clear implications, particularly in terms of expected gains associated with curbing capital 
flight and repatriating capital flight. The increase in domestic saving and tax revenue following 
repatriation will permit higher rates of physical capital accumulation, which will generate higher 
economic growth, especially to the extent that revenues from capital flight repatriation are primarily 
allocated to productive investments. In addition, according to the model, a decline in capital smuggling 
will result in higher productivity of human capital, which in turn will lead to higher economic growth. In 
the following section, we use data on the 40 Sub-Saharan countries to illustrate the potential gains from 
curbing capital flight and enforcing capital flight repatriation. The simulations are informed by the results 
from econometric estimation of the impact of capital flight on domestic investment as well as the impact 
of saving on investment. 
 
 
IV.  Data Analysis and Simulations of Potential Gains from Capital Flight Repatriation  
 
The analysis in this section is based on data for 40 sub-Saharan African countries with updated series of 
capital flight produced in Ndikumana and Boyce (2008).  The analysis is done in three steps: first, we 
relate the magnitude of capital flight to other forms of external capital inflows to shed light on the 
relative advantages of curbing capital flight and repatriation of capital flight on the one hand and relying 
on the conventional sources of external resources, namely FDI, official development aid including debt 
relief on the other hand. Second, we simulate the expected gains from capital flight repatriation using 
econometric results on the linkages between capital flight and domestic investment on the one hand, and 
domestic investment and saving on the other hand.  
 
The idea builds on historical relationships between domestic investment and saving to draw inferences 
on the gains that would accrue from increases in saving arising from capital flight repatriation. This 
methodology has the advantage that the simulations take into account the structural relationships 
between the relevant variable, namely domestic investment, saving, and capital flight.  
 
The third exercise is to simulate potential gains from capital flight repatriation in terms growth through 
human capital formation. We focus on the impact of capital repatriation on public expenditure on 
education, that is, we show by how much these expenditures can be increased by taking advantage of 
capital flight repatriation. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, despite the recent increase in private capital flows to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the sub-region still receives a disproportionately small share of the total flows to developing 
countries. Thus marginalization of the sub-region in the trade arena is compounded by the extremely 
skewed distribution of flows, making it harder for the sub-region to accelerate its growth rate and 
achieve sustainable development. 
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Furthermore, the marginalization of SSA in the financial and capital markets is exacerbated by the 
financial hemorrhage in the form of capital flight that the region has experienced over the past decades.  
The volume of capital flight from SSA exceeds that of the main forms of external capital such as debt, 
official development aid including debt relief, and private capital flows (Figure 2). The cumulative stock 
of capital flight from the 40 countries in the sample from 1970 to 2004 exceeds external debt stock (in 
2004) by a staggering USD 398.4 billion dollars, making this group of countries clearly a net creditor to the 
rest of the world [Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2003)]. 
 
Figure 2: Capital flight, ODA, debt service, and FDI flows to/from 40 SSA countries (billion 







































Source: capital flight is from Ndikumana and Boyce (2008); other series from GDF 2006. Note: For capital flight we 
exclude countries with a negative end-of-period stock of capital flight17 (where capital flight reversals outweigh capital 
flight) to obtain a comparative measure of financial hemorrhage to compare to other forms of inflows and outflows. 
 
Table 2 gives averages per country as well as total values of the flows and stocks for the sample of 40 
countries for capital flight and other forms of capital flows.  The first column gives the annual averages 
of capital flight and other flows while the second column contains the stock and the total real values of 
flows over the 1970-2004 period.  
 
From table 1, it is clear that capital flight dominates other forms of capital flows from and to SSA.  The 
data show that the sub-continent “financed” the rest of the world with capital up to USD 299.9 million 
per year from capital flight. This compares to an annual average per country of USD 329.1 million per 
year of official aid, USD 234.9 million of net private capital inflows, USD 147.6 million per year in FDI, 
and only 41.5 million in debt relief.  
 
                                                      
17 Countries with end-of-period stock of capital flight are: Benin, Botswana, Comoros, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.   13
By the end of the period, accumulated capital outflows amounted to USD 606.7 billion compared to a 
total of $460.8 billion of ODA, $2345.9 billion of net private inflows and $58.1 billion of debt relief. 
Clearly the amounts of the usual forms of external development financing to SSA pale compared to the 
volumes of capital that have fled the continent. 
 
Table 1: Capital flight and other flows, annual averages and totals over 1970-2004 
 
  Annual average flows per country 
(million $) 
Stocks and total real values (billion $) 
Stock of KF    606.7
Total real KF  299.9 419.9
Net foreign assets  398.4
ODA 329.1 460.8
Debt relief  41.5 58.1
FDI 147.6 147.6
Debt service  384.2 384.2
Net transfer on debt  96.3 96.3
Net private inflows  234.9 234.9
Sources: Capital flight is from Ndikumana and Boyce (2007); other series from Global Development Finance 
(2006). Note: except for “Stock of capital flight”, other flows and totals are in constant 2004 dollars. 
 
At the same time, the sub-continent has also experienced further drainage of resources in the form of 
payment of external debt. Over the period considered, the 40 countries in the sample paid $384.2 billion 
in debt service. Net transfer on debt amounted to only $96.3 billion. In fact, net transfers on debt to this 
group of countries have trended downward since the early 1980 and have recovered only recently thanks 
to debt relief. However, further efforts by the international community are needed to increase debt relief 
while also raising the share of grants and concessional lending in new official resource inflows to SSA. 
 
We examine potential gains from capital flight repatriation in terms of economic growth by focusing on 
one of the key drivers of economic growth, namely physical capital accumulation. The argument is that 
capital flight repatriation would boost domestic saving, which in turn would induce higher investment. In 
addition repatriated capital flight would increase the taxable base, raising government revenue, which 
would allow the government to increase public investment. This will ultimately boost capital formation, a 
key driver of long-term growth.  
 
To examine the potential gains from capital flight repatriation we use two sets of empirical relationships. 
First, we estimate econometrically the effects of capital flight on gross domestic investment, public 
investment and private investment. We control for real GDP to account for accelerator effects. As the 
results in Table 2 show, capital flight depresses private investment while it has no discernable effect on 
public investment.  
 
The results suggest that the negative effects of capital flight on domestic investment operate through 
private investment more than public investment. One of the reasons is that capital flight, part of which is 
operated by private actors, reduces the volume of private savings that can be allocated to productive 
investment. Another reason is that given that environments that are conducive to capital flight are most 
likely to be characterized by uncertainty, both macroeconomic and political, this implies that private 
agents will prefer to either defer investment or simply hold alternative assets, including foreign assets   14
rather than investing in the country. The savings-liquidity effects are compounded by the uncertainty 
effects in discouraging domestic private investment.  
 
 
Table 2: Impact of capital flight on Investment (2-step GMM estimates) 
 




Private investment  Public investment 
























Public investment      0.014 
(0.46)
 


















Observations 1109  717 684 705 
Notes: Regressions in levels and numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
 
We then test econometrically whether and to what extent an increase in domestic savings leads to an 
increase in domestic investment in this sample of countries. As discussed above, one of the ways in 
which capital flight depresses investment is by reducing domestic savings. This result is useful in 
examining potential gains from flight capital repatriation. Our approach is to assume that repatriated 
capital flight will augment the recipient African country’s domestic savings, which will stimulate domestic 
investment.  
 
To gage this effect of flight capital repatriation on investment, we estimate equations for gross domestic 
investment, public investment and private investment where investment depends on domestic savings, 
controlling for GDP (the accelerator effect). The results in Table 3 show that an increase in savings does 
lead to an increase in private, public, and total domestic investment. As expected, the effect on private 
investment is larger than that on public investment.  According to these results, a 1 percent increase in 
savings leads to a 0.109 percent increase in domestic investment. 
 
The estimated link between investment and saving as measured by the coefficient of 0.109 may seem 
smaller than expected. However, in this sample of countries, there are many factors that may explain this 
small elasticity of investment to savings. First, the weak link between investment and savings is a result 
of the inefficiencies of the financial systems in these countries that are unable to channel savings into 
productive investment. In particular, African financial systems are unable to perform their role of 
maturity transformation, creating a mismatch between the demand of long-term financing and the supply 
of savings which are mostly kept in the form of liquid and semi-liquid assets. Second, public investment, 
which is a large fraction of domestic investment is financed partly by aid and therefore not very sensitive 
to domestic saving.  
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Table 3: Impact of savings on investment (GMM 2-step results) 
 
 Total  domestic 
Investment 
Private investment  Public investment 


















   
















1125 715 703 
Notes: Saving and investment are in % of GDP and numbers in parentheses are p-values 
 
We will nevertheless use this estimated link between investment and saving to counterfactually illustrate 
the impact of capital flight on investment. Based on these results, we simulate the effects of capital flight 
repatriation by assuming that, first the repatriated capital constitutes an increase in domestic saving, and 
second that the increase in savings will lead to an increase in investment at a rate of 0.109 as estimated in 
the regression analysis.  
 
Evidently, it is difficult if not impossible to repatriate the totality of capital flight in the short term. Thus 
we will assume that only a fraction of the stock of capital flight is repatriated, intermediated into the 
financial system as savings, and eventually allocated to financing investment. Table A1 in the appendix 
shows for each country the current investment to GDP ratio and the ratios that would result from the 
repatriation of 25% of the stock of capital flight as estimated in 2004. We use average investment and 
saving to GDP ratios for the period 2000-2004. 
 
The results show clearly that SSA would generate tremendous benefits from capital flight repatriation. If 
only 25 per cent of the stock of capital flight accumulated up to 2004 was repatriated the average ratio of 
gross domestic investment to GDP for the sub-continent would increase from the current 18.5 per cent 
to 29.6 per cent (Table A1). This result is significant on two accounts.  First, it implies that through 
repatriation of only a quarter of capital flight stock, the sub-continent is likely to go from trailing other 
developing regions to leading in terms of domestic investment (Figure 3). Second, repatriation of this 
small fraction of capital flight would allow the sub-continent to move very close to the minimum 
threshold of investment that is conventionally considered to be necessary to achieve the required high 
growth needed to achieve the millennium development goals. Indeed the UNECA estimated in 1999 that 
Africa needed to achieve an investment/GDP ratio of 34 per cent in order to record the growth rate of 7 
per cent per annum that is needed to halve poverty by 2015 (UNECA 1999).  
 
In general, debates on accelerating growth through domestic investment have focused on mobilization of 
external private capital flows and increasing domestic resources especially by deepening financial 
intermediation to increase savings and by raising tax revenues [UNECA (2006), UNCTAD (2007)]. In   16
these debates, the issue of capital flight has been overlooked. Yet, without curbing capital flight, African 
countries will not be able to mobilize enough domestic resources and retain external resources to finance 
high levels of investment. Most importantly, flight capital and other forms of stolen funds held abroad 
constitute a source of substantial untapped resources that could contribute to boosting domestic 
investment. Thus African countries need to design strategies to repatriate flight capital, as an integral part 
of the national agenda for resource mobilization as a means of accelerating economic growth. 
 
















Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. Note: SSA + 25% = Gross domestic investment achieved 
following repatriation of 25 percent of the stock of capital flight. 
 
Another important channel of growth effects of flight capital repatriation is through accelerated human 
capital accumulation arising from higher funding for education. Given the low levels of government 
revenue and the myriad competing needs for economic development, funding for education has been 
low in most African countries. The response has been generally to seek more assistance from 
international development partners in the form of aid and debt relief. Capital flight repatriation 
constitutes a major untapped source for boosting expenditures on education in order to bridge the skills 
gap that constitutes a critical constraint to private sector development and limits international 
competitiveness for African countries. 
 
To provide an illustration of the potential gains from capital repatriation in terms of human capital 
investment, we assume that repatriation of capital flight benefits the country by allowing the government 
to increase expenditure on education. While some of the repatriated capital consists of stolen funds that 
would go directly into the government budget, a substantial fraction of capital fight is made of private 
assets earned legally but held abroad illegally in the sense that they were smuggled abroad or/and their 
owners do not pay tax on the assets. With regard to human capital investment, the repatriation of these 
private assets will generate benefits through tax revenue, which in turn will be used to finance education.  
   17
Using the data on the countries in the sample covered by this study, and assuming that a moderate 5% 
tax is levied on the repatriated capital and used to increase funding for education, we find that the 
average ratio of education expenditures to GDP would increase from 3.5% to 4.7% for the sample 
(Table A2). For some countries, the ratio would double as a result of increased funding from capital 
repatriation. This is the case for Burundi, Congo DR, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra 
Leone and Zambia. These substantial increases in education funding would ultimately allow countries to 
achieve much higher growth rates.  Capital flight repatriation as a source of funding for human capital 
accumulation has clear advantages relative to funding through external assistance as it avoids aid 
dependence and the associated conditionalities.  
 
V. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
This paper has argued that repatriation of capital flight should take a much more prominent place in the 
debates about mobilization of resources to increase financing for economic development in African 
countries. The obvious argument for repatriation is based on a simple moral principle: a large proportion 
of capital held abroad by Africans was obtained through embezzlement of national resources and 
fraudulent use of borrowed funds [Ndikumana and Boyce (1998), Fofack (2009)].18 Therefore those 
funds belong legitimately to the population of African countries and must be repatriated.  
 
The other argument is based on economics principles: instead of continuing to rely on debt-generating 
resources and other forms of financing that are usually associated with binding direct and indirect 
commitments, African countries would be much better off tapping  the stocks of funds held in Western 
financial centers in the form of capital flight. This source of financing, unlike aid and debt, does not 
imply any commitments of future payments to be shouldered by current and future generations. 
Moreover, a sizable amount of resources can be mobilized in the short run to finance the massive 
investments critically needed under the “big push” model. 
 
This paper has provided some illustration of the magnitude of potential benefits from capital flight 
repatriation through domestic investment and education. Using a representative sample of SSA 
countries, the analysis shows that based on the stock of capital flight as of 2004, and taking into account 
the empirical linkage between investment and saving, the analysis established that if only 25 percent of 
the stock of capital flight was repatriated to source countries in SSA, and channeled through the 
economy as savings, the average investment to GDP ratio in this sample would increase from 18.5% to 
29.6%. This would propel SSA on the top of other developing countries in terms of domestic 
investment.19  
 
These positive effects through domestic investment would eventually launch African countries on a path 
of higher economic growth, increasing the pace of poverty reduction. This would be achieved while 
keeping African countries free of the burden associated with external borrowing and other debt-
generating forms of external financing on which African countries have relied in the past. The gains 
from repatriation also vastly dominate the potential gains from debt relief, the most lauded source of 
non-debt generating external financing over the recent years. 
                                                      
18 For illustration on this argument, see of the Congo under former president Mobutu, see Ndikumana and Boyce(1998) 
and Fofack (2009) for the dynamic linkages between capital flight and external debt in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
19 This will go a long way to break the vicious circle of chronically low investment rates, which are believed to have 
undermined growth prospects during most of the Structural Adjustment era in SSA [Akyuz (2001) and Bayraktar and 
Fofack (2007)].   18
 
For these potential gains to materialize, however, it will be necessary to organize strategies both at the 
national and international level to induce repatriation of legitimate assets held abroad and impound 
illegitimate assets stolen from the continent. This implies responsibilities for and will require actions 
from African governments, western governments, and international banks and financial institutions. 
 
African governments have a huge responsibility in making flight capital repatriation possible. The first 
area of focus is improvement of the regulatory framework and the overall investment climate in order to 
attract private assets that were acquired legally and only held abroad for the purpose of maximization of 
returns on investment and risk minimization. The evidence still indicates that African countries trail 
behind other countries in terms of the quality of the investment climate [World Bank (2007)]. They score 
poorly in all areas related to the ease of doing business and exhibit relatively higher transactions costs 
(UNCTAD 2007). Under these conditions, it will be hard to attract legitimate assets held abroad by 
Africans. Thus, the strategy for repatriating legitimately acquired assets is an integral part of the national 
agenda for promoting both domestic and foreign investment. 
 
The second focus of policy is improvement of governance in African countries. Governments in Africa 
must demonstrate to asset holders that repatriated assets will not be subject to distortionary treatment 
through distortionary taxation, or even worse, to the risk of embezzlement by corrupt leaders. In this 
regard, commitment to transparency by the African leadership will be critical in convincing private asset 
holders to repatriate their wealth back into the continent. 
 
Western governments also have a very important role to play in facilitating repatriation of capital flight. 
The first area of responsibility is the enforcement of transparency in the banking system.20 Historically, 
African leaders and private asset holders have benefited from the tradition of secrecy that characterizes 
banking operations in some Western centers whereby depositors of funds are rarely asked to document 
the origin of their wealth. And even when the asset holders are well known to be corrupt leaders, 
western banks have often put their profit motives before the principles of honesty and transparency in 
the dealings with these corrupt leaders. It is the responsibility of Western governments to uproot these 
practices, which undermine the interests of African populations who are the legitimate claimants on 
these stolen assets. 
 
Western governments can also play a critical role in the efforts to recover these stolen assets by utilizing 
their economic and financial intelligence services to uncover deposits of illegally acquired funds 
especially from African leaders and their private acolytes. Since the beginning of the fight against 
terrorism in 2001, it has been demonstrated that given adequate political will on the part of Western 
governments, it is possible to effectively track down illicit transactions. Similarly, albeit belated, the 
leadership role played by the US government during the Clinton administration was critical for the 
success in tracking down hidden Nazzi asset. This experience showed that strong political determination 
is critical to enforce cooperation by Western financial centers in uncovering illicit funds. Such strong 
political commitment by Western governments will be indispensable for the success of ongoing efforts 
to repatriate the massive wealth stolen from African countries.  
 
                                                      
20 Ongoing efforts by the Obama’s administration to get rid of bank secrecy laws in the traditional safe haven nations in 
the West is an important step in the right direction.   19
In addition to individual countries’ initiatives, capital repatriation will require a concerted effort at the 
international level, especially through the ratification and implementation of specific conventions against 
fraud, corruption, and money laundering. In this respect, initiatives such as the UN Resolution 55/188 
on illegal transfer of assets, the Stolen Asset Recovery initiative, and the International Center for Asset 
Recovery deserve to be supported and given adequate material, human and political resources to 
promote transparency in international financial transactions. 
 
As the old saying goes, “it takes two to tango”. Thus, in the absence of complicity from Western banks, 
it would be nearly impossible for corrupt African leaders to channel and hide stolen funds abroad. Banks 
should not be allowed to hide behind the pretence of client protection to help corrupt leaders in draining 
the resources that otherwise could have been used to lift millions of Africans out of poverty. Of course, 
as profit-seeking firms, banks will always have the temptation to evade the law and collude in financial 
crime. Therefore, it is necessary for Western governments and international financial institutions to 
design regulatory mechanisms that provide for appropriate and symmetric sanctions to both African 
smugglers of wealth and their bankers. Thus far when stolen funds have been uncovered, only the 
African culprits have incurred penalties while their bankers have continued to enjoy impunity. This 
asymmetric treatment of financial crime undermines efforts aimed at curbing capital flight and 
recovering stolen funds from the African continent. It also undermines the deterrence capability of 
programs aimed at curbing illicit outflows of resources from the region. 
 
One possible mechanism for discouraging Western banks from serving as channels of capital smuggling 
from Africa is to force them to disclose the identity of holders of large balances to the authorities of 
both the country of incorporation of the bank and the country of origin of the asset holders. This would 
serve the purpose of not only uncovering stolen funds, but also forcing asset holders to pay taxes on 
legally acquired assets. 
 
Another mechanism is to include information on transparency of banking practices in the corporate 
rating of Western banks. Thus, if a bank is discovered to have colluded in acts of financial crimes such as 
capital smuggling, its rating would be downgraded accordingly. This would have adverse effects on the 
bank’s share prices and eventually its bottom line, which will eventually provide a disincentive for further 
engaging in colluding with government leaders and private asset holders in smuggling funds from the 
continent. 
 
Evidently, the critical ingredient in the success of these strategies is strong political will both at the level 
of African governments and at the international level to enforce transparency in banking and capital 
account transactions. African countries will have little chance in uncovering and repatriating stolen funds 
without the support and cooperation of their Western counterparts. Hence, repatriation of capital flight 
should figure prominently on the agenda for mobilizing domestic resources and boosting international 
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Table A1: Capital flows to developing countries, volumes (billion dollars) and share  



















$ Share  (%)
East Asia & Pacific  3.4  13.5% 7.7 16.5% 8.6 24.3% 9.5  11.2% 7.20 9.7%
Latin America & 
Caribbean 2.1  8.4% 5.1 10.9% 4.8 13.7% 6.3  7.5% 2.86 3.8%
Middle East & North 
Africa 7.0  27.6% 10.4 22.1% 4.5 12.8% 26.9  31.8% 17.42 23.4%
South Asia  5.3  20.6% 6.0 12.7% 4.2 11.9% 9.3  10.9% 12.89 17.3%
Sub-Saharan Africa  7.6  29.9% 17.8 37.9% 13.2 37.3% 32.6  38.5% 34.09 45.8%
All 25.5  100.0% 47.0 100.0% 35.4 100.0% 84.6  100.0% 74.5  100.0%
DI                 
East Asia & Pacific  1.4  14.3% 10.3 49.4% 44.3 32.0% 65.3  40.4% 117.4 38.0%
Latin America & 
Caribbean 6.4  66.5% 8.3 39.7% 79.3 57.2% 61.4  37.9% 107.2 34.7%
Middle East & North 
Africa 1.5  15.2% 1.0 4.9% 4.1 3.0% 9.1  5.6% 30.5 9.9%
South Asia  0.2  2.0% 0.3 1.4% 4.4 3.1% 8.4  5.2% 28.9 9.3%
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.2  1.9% 1.0 4.6% 6.5 4.7% 17.6  10.9% 25.3 8.2%
All 9.6  100.0% 20.9 100.0% 138.6 100.0% 161.8  100.0% 309.2 100.0%
Portfolio flows                 
East Asia & Pacific  0.0  358.3% 0.4 13.3% 6.6 51.5% 26.5  44.7% 48.6 39.1%
Latin America & 
Caribbean 0.0  0.0% 2.5 74.6% -0.6 -4.4% 12.5  21.1% 28.1 22.6%
Middle East & North 
Africa 0.0  0.0% 0.0 0.1% 0.2 1.9% 0.9  1.5% 2.1 1.7%
South Asia  0.0  0.0% 0.0 0.0% 2.4 18.6% 12.2  20.6% 35.4 28.5%
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  0.0% 0.4 11.9% 4.2 32.4% 7.2  12.1% 10.2 8.2%
All 0.0  100.0% 3.3 100.0% 12.8 100.0% 59.3  100.0% 124.4 100.0%  24
Net private flows                 
East Asia & Pacific  7.2  17.5% 17.0 49.2% 37.8 25.0% 107.6  41.1%    
Latin America & 
Caribbean 24.9  60.5% 13.3 38.4% 86.8 57.3% 92.4  35.3%  
Middle East & North 
Africa 3.5  8.4% 0.6 1.8% 5.2 3.4% 13.7  5.2%    
South Asia  1.2  3.0% 1.9 5.5% 10.7 7.0% 21.2  8.1%    
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.4  10.7% 1.8 5.2% 11.1 7.3% 27.1  10.3%  
All 41.1  100.0% 34.6 100.0% 151.5 100.0% 262.0  100.0%   
Source: Global Development Finance 2008. 
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Table A2: Estimated impact of capital flight repatriation on domestic investment and education expenditures 
Country 


















Angola  50950.6 24.7 12.8 16.4 3.3 6.6
Benin  -7663.9 5.5 19.0 19.0 3.1 3.1
Botswana  -1086.9 39.6 25.8 25.8 4.8 4.8
Burkina Faso  4670.6 5.0 19.4 30.3 2.1 3.3
Burundi  2566.6       3.0 7.9
Cameroon  27287.7 19.1 17.2 22.0 2.5 4.6
Cape Verde  2707.1       4.0 4.0
Central AR  2774.1 11.4 12.6 22.2 2.8 5.4
Chad  2345.6       1.3 2.0
Comoros  -168.7 0.4 11.9 11.9 4.1 4.1
Congo DR  36737.6 4.2 8.2 37.4 1.4 8.4
Congo Rep  17474.8 51.9 23.6 26.5 5.2 10.2
Cote d'Ivoire  54000.6 20.8 10.5 16.9 5.5 9.8
Ethiopia  22526.0 7.4 19.2 35.2 2.3 5.1
Gabon  11997.6 43.8 26.9 28.4 2.6 4.7
Ghana  11208.4 10.2 24.2 29.8 2.9 4.5
Guinea  1048.9 11.1 14.6 13.8 1.9 2.2
Kenya  6369.3 11.8 14.9 15.0 5.6 6.1
Lesotho  893.4       7.0 7.8
Madagascar  9570.8 9.5 18.6 31.2 2.4 5.1
Malawi  3825.4       3.1 5.6
Mali  -425.4 12.2 23.6 23.6 2.9 2.9
Mauritania  4006.0     58.1 4.1 7.4  26
Mauritius  650.1 24.7 23.5 22.2 3.6 3.6
Mozambique  14273.4 10.6 23.5 33.8 2.7 5.7
Niger  -8732.6 4.8 13.6 13.6 2.4 2.4
Nigeria  240781.0 32.6 22.4 27.9 1.9 6.1
Rwanda  5889.5 1.1 18.4 166.2 3.1 7.1
Sao Tome & 
Principe  1059.1       3.4 24.3
Senegal  -13077.3 8.7 19.7 19.7 3.9 3.9
Seychelles  2986.3 21.3 23.5 38.5 6.4 11.7
Sierra Leone  7005.4       2.0 10.1
South Africa  17492.3 20.3 16.4 14.9 5.7 5.7
Sudan  16325.0 14.7 18.4 16.4 2.4 3.3
Swaziland  1342.6 11.7 20.1 21.1 4.8 5.5
Tanzania  9963.4 9.5 18.3 19.1 2.3 3.4
Togo  -4064.6       4.2 4.2
Uganda  6853.7 7.3 20.3 22.0 2.7 4.0
Zambia  19814.3 16.0 22.8 37.8 3.2 7.8
Zimbabwe  24556.0 8.1 10.6 30.3 5.6 12.1
Sample 606733.7  10.4 18.5 29.6 3.5 5.0
 
Sources: capital flight figures from Ndikumana and Boyce (2008); saving, investment and education ratios from WDI 2007. 
 
 